🔥🔥🔥 What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay

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What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay



The War to End All Wars World War I saw a change in warfare, from the hand-to-hand style of older wars to the inclusion of weapons Mixed Research Method used technology and removed the individual from close combat. It emphasised that struggle between nations and "races" was natural and that only the fittest nations deserved to survive. What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay Serbian government, having failed to get Albania, now demanded for What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay other spoils of the First Balkan War to be reapportioned, and Russia failed to pressure Serbia to back down. That is compounded by historical Blog Credibility In Social Media What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay over time What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay, particularly as classified historical archives become available, and as perspectives and ideologies of What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay have changed. Causes Of World War 1 Words 6 Personal Narrative: My School Counselor In the First World War started and created one of the What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay devastating events in the world What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay more than 17 million people. Strong armies and navies were needed so they could defend their home Misconceptions In Psychology to protect…. By the s or the s, all the major powers were preparing for a large-scale war although What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay expected one.

4 MAIN Causes of World War I Explained

World War 1 was a military conflict. WW1 involved all the biggest powers of the war. This war also invoked two major alliances. The alliances were able to give each other finacle help with the war they were fighting, as well as supplying the materials and weaponry. World War 1 was the most destructive and devastating event to ever happen to our country. When World War 1 is brought up many people agree to disagree on who actually started the war, which leads to the question, Who is to Blame? The debate on who to blame is between Serbia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. Although there is a disagreement on which of these countries were the potential cause for World War 1, Serbia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany were the main reasons for the outbreak of World War.

World war 1, also known as the Great War, was one of the most devastating wars in history. The War Occurred Mostly Europe and took four long years, it started from and ended in In the First world war, there were great amount casualties. In the war, 17 million people died and 20 million wounded. The sad thing is that about 7 innocent people died from this war. This was has been a tragedy for many people in Europe because they have never witnessed was a war like this before. People believe.

Causes of World War 1. There is a chain of events that leads to the start World War 1, such as Moroccan crisis, Alliances, Militarism, Nationalism, Pan Nationalism, Imperialism, Economic factors, first, second and third crisis. I believe that there are few of them, which are more significant than others. Militarism and Moroccan crisis were one of the most important factors, however the European alliances, Militarism and Crisis 2 were more significant. Part 1: Imperialism played one of the key roles. Recall how fast water can flow, the war was in like manner started in Europe and gradually involved several states of the world through allies.

However, Nationalism, Naval arm race and the system of alliance were the main causes of World War 1. One of the significant causes of World War 1 is. World War 1 better known as The Great War , was caused by a great many elements, some long-term, some short-term and the spark. In this essay, I will thoroughly explain what started this war and which reasons made it start sooner. What in my opinion was the least important reason, for the war starting was how much richer all the countries were getting. It was the result of aggression towards other countries.

Rising nationalism of European nations, economic and imperial completion, and fear of the war prompted alliances and increase of armed forces. This created tension contributing to the outbreak of war. But it was assassination in Sarajevo that triggered World War 1. In the 19th Century, people of the same nationality united under one border. The intent of German policy was to drive a wedge between the British and French, but in both cases, it produced the opposite effect and Germany was isolated diplomatically, most notably by lacking the support of Italy despite it being in the Triple Alliance.

The French protectorate over Morocco was established officially in In , however, the African scene was peaceful. The continent was almost fully divided up by the imperial powers, with only Liberia and Ethiopia still independent. There were no major disputes there pitting any two European powers against each other. Marxists typically attributed the start of the war to imperialism. Richard Hamilton observed that the argument went that since industrialists and bankers were seeking raw materials, new markets and new investments overseas, if they were blocked by other powers, the "obvious" or "necessary" solution was war. Hamilton somewhat criticized the view that the war was launched to secure colonies but agreed that while imperialism may have been on the mind of key decision makers.

He argued that it was not necessarily for logical, economic reasons. Firstly, the different powers of the war had different imperial holdings. Britain had the largest empire in the world and Russia had the second largest, but France had a modestly-sized empire. Germany had a few unprofitable colonies, and Austria-Hungary had no overseas holdings or desire to secure any and so the divergent interests require any "imperialism argument" to be specific in any supposed "interests" or "needs" that decision makers would be trying to meet. None of Germany's colonies made more money than was required to maintain them, and they also were only 0. Thus, he argues that colonies were pursued mainly as a sign of German power and prestige, rather than for profit.

While Russia eagerly pursued colonisation in East Asia by seizing control of Manchuria, it had little success; the Manchurian population was never sufficiently integrated into the Russian economy and efforts to make Manchuria, a captive trade market did not end Russia's negative trade deficit with China. Hamilton argued that the "imperialism argument" depended upon the view of national elites being informed, rational, and calculating, but it is equally possible to consider that decision-makers were uninformed or ignorant. Hamilton suggested that imperial ambitions may have been driven by groupthink because every other country was doing it.

That made policymakers think that their country should do the same Hamilton noted that Bismarck was famously not moved by such peer pressure and ended Germany's limited imperialist movement and regarded colonial ambitions as a waste of money but simultaneously recommended them to other nations. Hamilton was more critical of the view that capitalists and business leaders drove the war. He thought that businessmen, bankers, and financiers were generally against the war, as they viewed it as being perilous to economic prosperity.

The decision of Austria-Hungary to go to war was made by the monarch, his ministers, and military leaders, with practically no representation from financial and business leaders even though Austria-Hungary was then developing rapidly. Furthermore, evidence can be found from the Austro-Hungarian stock market, which responded to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand with unease but no sense of alarm and only a small decrease in share value. However, when it became clear that war was a possibility, share values dropped sharply, which suggested that investors did not see war as serving their interests. One of the strongest sources of opposition to the war was from major banks, whose financial bourgeoisie regarded the army as the reserve of the aristocracy and utterly foreign to the banking universe.

While the banks had ties to arms manufacturers, it was those companies that had links to the military, not the banks, which were pacifistic and profoundly hostile to the prospect of war. However, the banks were largely excluded from the nation's foreign affairs. Likewise, German business leaders had little influence. Hugo Stinnes , a leading German industrialist, advocated peaceful economic development and believed that Germany would be able to rule Europe by economic power and that war would be a disruptive force.

Carl Duisberg , a chemical industrialist, hoped for peace and believed that the war would set German economic development back a decade, as Germany's extraordinary prewar growth had depended upon international trade and interdependence. While some bankers and industrialists tried to curb Wilhelm II away from war, their efforts ended in failure. There is no evidence they ever received a direct response from the Kaiser, chancellor, or foreign secretary or that their advice was discussed in depth by the Foreign Office or the General Staff. The German leadership measured power not in financial ledgers but land and military might. Lord Nathanial Rothschild , a leading British banker, called the financial editor at The Times newspaper and insisted for the paper to denounce the war and to advocate for neutrality, but the lead members of the newspaper ultimately decided that the paper should support intervention.

Generally speaking, the European business leaders were in favour of profits and peace allowed for stability and investment opportunities across national borders, but war brought the disruption trade, the confiscation of holdings, and the risk of increased taxation. Even arms manufacturers, the so-called "Merchants of Death," would not necessarily benefit since they could make money selling weapons at home, but they could lose access to foreign markets. Krupp, a major arms manufacturer, started the war with 48 million marks in profits but ended it million marks in debt, and the first year of peace saw further losses of 36 million marks.

William Mulligan argues that while economic and political factors were often interdependent, economic factors tended towards peace. Prewar trade wars and financial rivalries never threatened to escalate into conflict. Governments would mobilise bankers and financiers to serve their interests, rather than the reverse. The commercial and financial elite recognised peace as necessary for economic development and used its influence to resolve diplomatic crises. Economic rivalries existed but were framed largely by political concerns. Prior to the war, there were few signs that the international economy for war in the summer of Social Darwinism was a theory of human evolution loosely based on Darwinism that influenced most European intellectuals and strategic thinkers from to It emphasised that struggle between nations and "races" was natural and that only the fittest nations deserved to survive.

German colonial rule in Africa in to was an expression of nationalism and moral superiority, which was justified by constructing an image of the natives as "Other. German colonization was characterized by the use of repressive violence in the name of "culture" and "civilisation. Furthermore, the wide acceptance of Social Darwinism by intellectuals justified Germany's right to acquire colonial territories as a matter of the "survival of the fittest," according to the historian Michael Schubert. The model suggested an explanation of why some ethnic groups, then called "races," had been for so long antagonistic, such as Germans and Slavs.

They were natural rivals, destined to clash. Senior German generals like Helmuth von Moltke the Younger talked in apocalyptic terms about the need for Germans to fight for their existence as a people and culture. MacMillan states: "Reflecting the Social Darwinist theories of the era, many Germans saw Slavs, especially Russia, as the natural opponent of the Teutonic races. Britain admired Germany for its economic successes and social welfare provision but also regarded Germany as illiberal, militaristic, and technocratic. War was seen as a natural and viable or even useful instrument of policy. Russia was viewed as growing stronger every day, and it was believed that Germany had to strike while it still could before it was crushed by Russia.

Nationalism made war a competition between peoples, nations or races, rather than kings and elites. It tended to glorify warfare, the taking of initiative, and the warrior male role. Social Darwinism played an important role across Europe, but J. Leslie has argued that it played a critical and immediate role in the strategic thinking of some important hawkish members of the Austro-Hungarian government. Although general narratives of the war tend to emphasize the importance of alliances in binding the major powers to act in the event of a crisis such as the July Crisis, historians such as Margaret MacMillan warn against the argument that alliances forced the Great Powers to act as they did: "What we tend to think of as fixed alliances before the First World War were nothing of the sort.

They were much more loose, much more porous, much more capable of change. The most important alliances in Europe required participants to agree to collective defence if they were attacked. Some represented formal alliances, but the Triple Entente represented only a frame of mind:. There are three notable exceptions that demonstrate that alliances did not in themselves force the great powers to act:. By the s or the s, all the major powers were preparing for a large-scale war although none expected one.

Germany, France, Austria, Italy, Russia, and some smaller countries set up conscription systems in which young men would serve from one to three years in the army and then spend the next twenty years or so in the reserves with annual summer training. Men from higher social statuses became officers. Each country devised a mobilization system in which the reserves could be called up quickly and sent to key points by rail. Every year, the plans were updated and expanded in terms of complexity. Each country stockpiled arms and supplies for an army that ran into the millions.

Germany in had a regular professional army of , with an additional 1. By , the regular army was , strong and the reserves 3. The French in had 3. The various national war plans had been perfected by but with Russia and Austria trailing in effectiveness. Recent wars since had typically been short: a matter of months. All war plans called for a decisive opening and assumed victory would come after a short war. None planned for the food and munitions needs of the long stalemate that actually happened in to As David Stevenson put it, "A self-reinforcing cycle of heightened military preparedness The armaments race It was "the armaments race and the speculation about imminent or preventive wars" that made his death in the trigger for war.

The Second Hague Conference was held in All signatories except for Germany supported disarmament. Germany also did not want to agree to binding arbitration and mediation. The Kaiser was concerned that the United States would propose disarmament measures, which he opposed. All parties tried to revise international law to their own advantage. Historians have debated the role of the German naval buildup as the principal cause of deteriorating Anglo-German relations. In any case, Germany never came close to catching up with Britain. From to , the Royal Navy embarked on its own massive expansion to keep ahead of the Germans. The competition came to focus on the revolutionary new ships based on the Dreadnought , which was launched in and gave Britain a battleship that far outclassed any other in Europe.

The overwhelming British response proved to Germany that its efforts were unlikely ever to equal the Royal Navy. In , the British had a 3. Ferguson argues, "So decisive was the British victory in the naval arms race that it is hard to regard it as in any meaningful sense a cause of the First World War. The US Navy was in a period of growth, which made the German gains very ominous. In Britain in , there was intense internal debate about new ships because of the growing influence of John Fisher 's ideas and increasing financial constraints. In , Germany adopted a policy of building submarines, instead of new dreadnoughts and destroyers, effectively abandoning the race, but it kept the new policy secret to delay other powers from following suit.

The main Russian goals included strengthening its role as the protector of Eastern Christians in the Balkans, such as in Serbia. The start of the war renewed attention of old goals: expelling the Ottomans from Constantinople, extending Russian dominion into eastern Anatolia and Persian Azerbaijan, and annexing Galicia. The conquests would assure the Russian predominance in the Black Sea and access to the Mediterranean. Traditional narratives of the war suggested that when the war began, both sides believed that the war would end quickly.

Rhetorically speaking, there was an expectation that the war would be "over by Christmas" in That is important for the origins of the conflict since it suggests that since it was expected that the war would be short, statesmen tended not to take gravity of military action as seriously as they might have done so otherwise. Modern historians suggest a nuanced approach. There is ample evidence to suggest that statesmen and military leaders thought the war would be lengthy and terrible and have profound political consequences. While it is true all military leaders planned for a swift victory, many military and civilian [ citation needed ] leaders recognised that the war might be long and highly destructive.

The principal German and French military leaders, including Moltke, Ludendorff, and Joffre, expected a long war. Moltke hoped that if a European war broke out, it would be resolved swiftly, but he also conceded that it might drag on for years, wreaking immeasurable ruin. Asquith wrote of the approach of "Armageddon" and French and Russian generals spoke of a "war of extermination" and the "end of civilization. Clark concluded, "In the minds of many statesmen, the hope for a short war and the fear of a long one seemed to have cancelled each other out, holding at bay a fuller appreciation of the risks.

Moltke, Joffre, Conrad, and other military commanders held that seizing the initiative was extremely important. That theory encouraged all belligerents to devise war plans to strike first to gain the advantage. The war plans all included complex plans for mobilization of the armed forces, either as a prelude to war or as a deterrent. The continental Great Powers' mobilization plans included arming and transporting millions of men and their equipment, typically by rail and to strict schedules, hence the metaphor "war by timetable. The mobilization plans limited the scope of diplomacy, as military planners wanted to begin mobilisation as quickly as possible to avoid being caught on the defensive. They also put pressure on policymakers to begin their own mobilization once it was discovered that other nations had begun to mobilize.

In , A. Taylor wrote that mobilization schedules were so rigid that once they were begun, they could not be canceled without massive disruption of the country and military disorganisation. Thus, diplomatic overtures conducted after the mobilizations had begun were ignored. Russia ordered a partial mobilization on 25 July against Austria-Hungary only. Their lack of prewar planning for the partial mobilization made the Russians realize by 29 July that it would be impossible and interfere with a general mobilization.

Only a general mobilization could be carried out successfully. The Russians were, therefore, faced with only two options: canceling the mobilization during a crisis or moving to full mobilization, the latter of which they did on 30 July. They, therefore, mobilized along both the Russian border with Austria-Hungary and the border with Germany. German mobilization plans assumed a two-front war against France and Russia and had the bulk of the German army massed against France and taking the offensive in the west, and a smaller force holding East Prussia.

The plans were based on the assumption that France would mobilize significantly faster than Russia. On 28 July, Germany learned through its spy network that Russia had implemented partial mobilisation and its "Period Preparatory to War. Christopher Clark states: "German efforts at mediation — which suggested that Austria should 'Halt in Belgrade' and use the occupation of the Serbian capital to ensure its terms were met — were rendered futile by the speed of Russian preparations, which threatened to force the Germans to take counter-measures before mediation could begin to take effect.

But by the time that happened, the Russian government had been moving troops and equipment to the German front for a week. The Russians were the first great power to issue an order of general mobilisation and the first Russo-German clash took place on German, not on Russian soil, following the Russian invasion of East Prussia. That doesn't mean that the Russians should be 'blamed' for the outbreak of war. Rather it alerts us to the complexity of the events that brought war about and the limitations of any thesis that focuses on the culpability of one actor.

Immediately after the end of hostilities, Anglo-American historians argued that Germany was solely responsible for the start of the war. However, academic work in the English-speaking world in the late s and the s blamed the participants more equally. The historian Fritz Fischer unleashed an intense worldwide debate in the s on Germany's long-term goals. The American historian Paul Schroeder agrees with the critics that Fisher exaggerated and misinterpreted many points. However, Schroeder endorses Fisher's basic conclusion:. From on, Germany did pursue world power. This bid arose from deep roots within Germany's economic, political, and social structures. Once the war broke out, world power became Germany's essential goal.

However, Schroeder argues that all of that were not the main causes of the war in Indeed, the search for a single main cause is not a helpful approach to history. Instead, there are multiple causes any one or two of which could have launched the war. He argues, "The fact that so many plausible explanations for the outbreak of the war have been advanced over the years indicates on the one hand that it was massively overdetermined, and on the other that no effort to analyze the causal factors involved can ever fully succeed. Debate over the country that "started" the war and who bears the blame still continues.

Few historians agreed wholly with his [Fischer's] thesis of a premeditated war to achieve aggressive foreign policy aims, but it was generally accepted that Germany's share of responsibility was larger than that of the other great powers. On historians inside Germany, she adds, "There was 'a far-reaching consensus about the special responsibility of the German Reich' in the writings of leading historians, though they differed in how they weighted Germany's role. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Historiography of the topic. For the article on the war itself, see World War I.

Main article: French entry into World War I. Main article: Bosnian crisis. Main article: Agadir crisis. Main article: Italo-Turkish War. Main article: Balkan Wars. Further information: Fischer controversy. See also: New Imperialism. Main article: Anglo—German naval arms race. See also: Cult of the offensive. Main article: Historiography of the causes of World War I. World War I portal. International Security. JSTOR War of illusions: German policies from to Chatto and Windus.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina had been nominally under Concussions During Sports sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire but What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay by Austria-Hungary since the Congress of Berlin in For Bill Cosby Case Study reason, all these big powers were trying to make the What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay out of unrest in Europe, leading to more conflict between themselves. Militarism and What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay crisis were one of the most important factors, however the European alliances, What Was The Causes Of World War 1 Essay and Crisis 2 were more significant. This action alone progressed the beginning of the war drastically, as each country began taking sides after this. Recent wars since had typically been short: a matter of months.

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