⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐ Summary Of What The Words We Use Say About Us By David Brooks

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Summary Of What The Words We Use Say About Us By David Brooks

This movements fought a better society with better treatment even though there would be no economic incentives to do so. Ina team of American and Japanese researchers found Summary Of What The Words We Use Say About Us By David Brooks women in multigenerational households in Japan were at greater risk of heart disease than women living Summary Of What The Words We Use Say About Us By David Brooks spouses Japanese Cuisine Book Review, likely because of stress. The families they started were nuclear Mayan Influence On Maya. These people are often called Dreamers. Without extended families, older Americans have also suffered. Vince Killoran. The government of Panem, The Capitol, holds the wealth of Panem giving it the power to control all Acute Stress Disorder Case Study.

10 Questions for Columnist David Brooks

After the meal, there are piles of plates in the sink, squads of children conspiring mischievously in the basement. Groups of young parents huddle in a hallway, making plans. The old men nap on couches, waiting for dessert. For a while they did everything together, like in the old country. But as the movie goes along, the extended family begins to split apart. Some members move to the suburbs for more privacy and space. One leaves for a job in a different state. Convenience, privacy, and mobility are more important than family loyalty.

When you violate the protocol, the whole family structure begins to collapse. As the years go by in the movie, the extended family plays a smaller and smaller role. In the final scene, the main character is living alone in a nursing home, wondering what happened. And that has continued even further today. Once, families at least gathered around the television. Now each person has their own screen. This is the story of our times—the story of the family, once a dense cluster of many siblings and extended kin, fragmenting into ever smaller and more fragile forms. But then, because the nuclear family is so brittle, the fragmentation continued. In many sectors of society, nuclear families fragmented into single-parent families, single-parent families into chaotic families or no families.

The shift from bigger and interconnected extended families to smaller and detached nuclear families ultimately led to a familial system that liberates the rich and ravages the working-class and the poor. Annie Lowrey: The great affordability crisis breaking America. This article is about that process, and the devastation it has wrought—and about how Americans are now groping to build new kinds of family and find better ways to live. In , three-quarters of American workers were farmers. Most of the other quarter worked in small family businesses, like dry-goods stores. People needed a lot of labor to run these enterprises. It was not uncommon for married couples to have seven or eight children.

In addition, there might be stray aunts, uncles, and cousins, as well as unrelated servants, apprentices, and farmhands. On some southern farms, of course, enslaved African Americans were also an integral part of production and work life. According to Ruggles, in , 90 percent of American families were corporate families. Until , roughly three-quarters of Americans older than 65 lived with their kids and grandkids.

Nuclear families existed, but they were surrounded by extended or corporate families. Read: What number of kids makes parents happiest? Extended families have two great strengths. The first is resilience. An extended family is one or more families in a supporting web. Your spouse and children come first, but there are also cousins, in-laws, grandparents—a complex web of relationships among, say, seven, 10, or 20 people.

If a mother dies, siblings, uncles, aunts, and grandparents are there to step in. If a relationship between a father and a child ruptures, others can fill the breach. Extended families have more people to share the unexpected burdens—when a kid gets sick in the middle of the day or when an adult unexpectedly loses a job. A detached nuclear family, by contrast, is an intense set of relationships among, say, four people.

If one relationship breaks, there are no shock absorbers. In a nuclear family, the end of the marriage means the end of the family as it was previously understood. The second great strength of extended families is their socializing force. Multiple adults teach children right from wrong, how to behave toward others, how to be kind. Over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, industrialization and cultural change began to threaten traditional ways of life. Many people in Britain and the United States doubled down on the extended family in order to create a moral haven in a heartless world. According to Ruggles, the prevalence of extended families living together roughly doubled from to , and this way of life was more common than at any time before or since.

This shift was led by the upper-middle class, which was coming to see the family less as an economic unit and more as an emotional and moral unit, a rectory for the formation of hearts and souls. But while extended families have strengths, they can also be exhausting and stifling. Family bonds are thicker, but individual choice is diminished. You have less space to make your own way in life. In the Victorian era, families were patriarchal, favoring men in general and first-born sons in particular. As factories opened in the big U. These young people married as soon as they could. A young man on a farm might wait until 26 to get married; in the lonely city, men married at 22 or From to , the average age of first marriage dropped by 3.

From September Daniel Markovits on how life became an endless, terrible competition. The families they started were nuclear families. The decline of multigenerational cohabiting families exactly mirrors the decline in farm employment. Children were no longer raised to assume economic roles—they were raised so that at adolescence they could fly from the nest, become independent, and seek partners of their own. They were raised not for embeddedness but for autonomy. By the s, the nuclear family with a male breadwinner had replaced the corporate family as the dominant family form.

By , For a time, it all seemed to work. From to , divorce rates dropped, fertility rates rose, and the American nuclear family seemed to be in wonderful shape. And most people seemed prosperous and happy. During this period, a certain family ideal became engraved in our minds: a married couple with 2. When we think of the American family, many of us still revert to this ideal. When we have debates about how to strengthen the family, we are thinking of the two-parent nuclear family, with one or two kids, probably living in some detached family home on some suburban street. Today, only a minority of American households are traditional two-parent nuclear families and only one-third of American individuals live in this kind of family.

That —65 window was not normal. It was a freakish historical moment when all of society conspired, wittingly and not, to obscure the essential fragility of the nuclear family. For one thing, most women were relegated to the home. Many corporations, well into the midth century, barred married women from employment: Companies would hire single women, but if those women got married, they would have to quit. Demeaning and disempowering treatment of women was rampant. Women spent enormous numbers of hours trapped inside the home under the headship of their husband, raising children.

Finally, conditions in the wider society were ideal for family stability. The postwar period was a high-water mark of church attendance, unionization, social trust, and mass prosperity—all things that correlate with family cohesion. A man could relatively easily find a job that would allow him to be the breadwinner for a single-income family. By , the median American man age 25 to 29 was earning nearly percent more than his father had earned at about the same age. In short, the period from to demonstrated that a stable society can be built around nuclear families—so long as women are relegated to the household, nuclear families are so intertwined that they are basically extended families by another name, and every economic and sociological condition in society is working together to support the institution.

But these conditions did not last. The constellation of forces that had briefly shored up the nuclear family began to fall away, and the sheltered family of the s was supplanted by the stressed family of every decade since. Some of the strains were economic. The major strains were cultural. Society became more individualistic and more self-oriented. People put greater value on privacy and autonomy.

A rising feminist movement helped endow women with greater freedom to live and work as they chose. Read: Gen-X women are caught in a generational tug-of-war. Now marriage is primarily about adult fulfillment. Read: An interview with Eli Finkel on how we expect too much from our romantic partners. This cultural shift was very good for some adults, but it was not so good for families generally.

Fewer relatives are around in times of stress to help a couple work through them. If you married for love, staying together made less sense when the love died. This attenuation of marital ties may have begun during the late s: The number of divorces increased about fifteenfold from to , and then climbed more or less continuously through the first several decades of the nuclear-family era. Americans today have less family than ever before. From to , the share of households consisting of married couples with kids has been cut in half. In , according to census data, just 13 percent of all households were single-person households. In , that figure was 28 percent.

In , 75 percent of Americans older than 65 lived with relatives; by , only 18 percent did. Over the past two generations, people have spent less and less time in marriage—they are marrying later, if at all, and divorcing more. In , 27 percent of marriages ended in divorce; today, about 45 percent do. In , 72 percent of American adults were married. In , nearly half of American adults were single. According to a report from the Urban Institute, roughly 90 percent of Baby Boomer women and 80 percent of Gen X women married by age 40, while only about 70 percent of late-Millennial women were expected to do so—the lowest rate in U. Over the past two generations, families have also gotten a lot smaller.

The general American birth rate is half of what it was in In , most American family households had no children. There are more American homes with pets than with kids. In , about 20 percent of households had five or more people. As of , only 9. Over the past two generations, the physical space separating nuclear families has widened. Before, sisters-in-law shouted greetings across the street at each other from their porches. But lawns have grown more expansive and porch life has declined, creating a buffer of space that separates the house and family from anyone else.

As Mandy Len Catron recently noted in The Atlantic , married people are less likely to visit parents and siblings, and less inclined to help them do chores or offer emotional support. A code of family self-sufficiency prevails: Mom, Dad, and the kids are on their own, with a barrier around their island home. Finally, over the past two generations, families have grown more unequal. America now has two entirely different family regimes. Among the highly educated, family patterns are almost as stable as they were in the s; among the less fortunate, family life is often utter chaos.

Think of all the child-rearing labor affluent parents now buy that used to be done by extended kin: babysitting, professional child care, tutoring, coaching, therapy, expensive after-school programs. For that matter, think of how the affluent can hire therapists and life coaches for themselves, as replacement for kin or close friends. Affluent conservatives often pat themselves on the back for having stable nuclear families. They preach that everybody else should build stable families too. But then they ignore one of the main reasons their own families are stable: They can afford to purchase the support that extended family used to provide—and that the people they preach at, further down the income scale, cannot.

In , the family structures of the rich and poor did not differ that greatly. Now there is a chasm between them. As of , 85 percent of children born to upper-middle-class families were living with both biological parents when the mom was Among working-class families, only 30 percent were. According to a report from the National Center for Health Statistics, college-educated women ages 22 to 44 have a 78 percent chance of having their first marriage last at least 20 years. Women in the same age range with a high-school degree or less have only about a 40 percent chance.

Among Americans ages 18 to 55, only 26 percent of the poor and 39 percent of the working class are currently married. The causes are economic, cultural, and institutional all at once. People who grow up in a nuclear family tend to have a more individualistic mind-set than people who grow up in a multigenerational extended clan. People with an individualistic mind-set tend to be less willing to sacrifice self for the sake of the family, and the result is more family disruption.

People who grow up in disrupted families have more trouble getting the education they need to have prosperous careers. The children in those families become more isolated and more traumatized. Read: The working-to-afford-child-care conundrum. Many people growing up in this era have no secure base from which to launch themselves and no well-defined pathway to adulthood. For those who have the human capital to explore, fall down, and have their fall cushioned, that means great freedom and opportunity—and for those who lack those resources, it tends to mean great confusion, drift, and pain.

Over the past 50 years, federal and state governments have tried to mitigate the deleterious effects of these trends. The focus has always been on strengthening the nuclear family, not the extended family. Occasionally, a discrete program will yield some positive results, but the widening of family inequality continues unabated. The people who suffer the most from the decline in family support are the vulnerable—especially children. In , roughly 5 percent of children were born to unmarried women. Now about 40 percent are. The Pew Research Center reported that 11 percent of children lived apart from their father in In , 27 percent did. Now about half of American children will spend their childhood with both biological parents.

American children are more likely to live in a single-parent household than children from any other country. Read: The divorce gap. We all know stable and loving single-parent families. But on average, children of single parents or unmarried cohabiting parents tend to have worse health outcomes, worse mental-health outcomes, less academic success, more behavioral problems, and higher truancy rates than do children living with their two married biological parents.

According to work by Richard V. Reeves , a co-director of the Center on Children and Families at the Brookings Institution, if you are born into poverty and raised by your married parents, you have an 80 percent chance of climbing out of it. If you are born into poverty and raised by an unmarried mother, you have a 50 percent chance of remaining stuck. While children are the vulnerable group most obviously affected by recent changes in family structure, they are not the only one. Consider single men.

Extended families provided men with the fortifying influences of male bonding and female companionship. Today many American males spend the first 20 years of their life without a father and the next 15 without a spouse. Kay Hymowitz of the Manhattan Institute has spent a good chunk of her career examining the wreckage caused by the decline of the American family , and cites evidence showing that, in the absence of the connection and meaning that family provides, unmarried men are less healthy—alcohol and drug abuse are common—earn less, and die sooner than married men.

For women, the nuclear-family structure imposes different pressures. Though women have benefited greatly from the loosening of traditional family structures—they have more freedom to choose the lives they want—many mothers who decide to raise their young children without extended family nearby find that they have chosen a lifestyle that is brutally hard and isolating. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that women still spend significantly more time on housework and child care than men do, according to recent data. Thus, the reality we see around us: stressed, tired mothers trying to balance work and parenting, and having to reschedule work when family life gets messy.

Read: The loneliness of early parenthood. Without extended families, older Americans have also suffered. Finally, because groups that have endured greater levels of discrimination tend to have more fragile families, African Americans have suffered disproportionately in the era of the detached nuclear family. Nearly half of black families are led by an unmarried single woman, compared with less than one-sixth of white families. The high rate of black incarceration guarantees a shortage of available men to be husbands or caretakers of children. According to census data from , 25 percent of black women over 35 have never been married, compared with 8 percent of white women.

Two-thirds of African American children lived in single-parent families in , compared with a quarter of white children. Black single-parent families are most concentrated in precisely those parts of the country in which slavery was most prevalent. Research by John Iceland, a professor of sociology and demography at Penn State, suggests that the differences between white and black family structure explain 30 percent of the affluence gap between the two groups. In , the journalist and urbanist Jane Jacobs published her final book , an assessment of North American society called Dark Age Ahead.

As the social structures that support the family have decayed, the debate about it has taken on a mythical quality. Social conservatives insist that we can bring the nuclear family back. But the conditions that made for stable nuclear families in the s are never returning. If only a minority of households are traditional nuclear families, that means the majority are something else: single parents, never-married parents, blended families, grandparent-headed families, serial partnerships, and so on. Conservative ideas have not caught up with this reality. Progressives, meanwhile, still talk like self-expressive individualists of the s: People should have the freedom to pick whatever family form works for them.

And, of course, they should. But many of the new family forms do not work well for most people—and while progressive elites say that all family structures are fine, their own behavior suggests that they believe otherwise. As the sociologist W. Bradford Wilcox has pointed out, highly educated progressives may talk a tolerant game on family structure when speaking about society at large, but they have extremely strict expectations for their own families. When Wilcox asked his University of Virginia students if they thought having a child out of wedlock was wrong, 62 percent said it was not wrong. But they were more likely to say that personally they did not approve of having a baby out of wedlock. On this most central issue, our shared culture often has nothing relevant to say—and so for decades things have been falling apart.

In that campaign, an ad showing a scantily clad or unclad -- you couldn't tell because of the way the image was -- accidentally? The goal, of course, was to get white voters to think about which of them was really "one of us. But Brooks himself offers a striking example of the activation of networks for the purpose of creating a false impression:. Westen urges Democratic candidates to go for the gut, and includes a number of speeches that he wishes Democratic candidates had given.

He wishes, for example, Al Gore had hit George Bush harder for being a drunk. He wishes Gore had interrupted a presidential debate and barked at Bush, "If someone is going to restore dignity to the Oval Office, it isn't a man who drank his way through three decades of his life and got investigated by his father's own Securities and Exchange Commission for swindling people out of their retirement savings. At another point, he imagines Gore exploding: "Why don't you tell us how many times you got behind the wheel of a car with a few drinks under your belt, endangering your neighbors' kids?

Where I come from, we call that a drunk. What Brooks knows as a writer is that the way you contextualize a passage has everything to do with the impression readers take away from it. Reading these quotes -- as woven together with colorful phrases such as "He wishes Gore had interrupted a presidential debate and barked at Bush [emphasis added], "he imagines Gore exploding [emphasis added], and later, "the sort of crude emotional outbursts Westen recommends " [emphasis added] -- the reader would have the distinct impression that I thought Gore should have repeatedly and viciously attacked Bush for his history of alcoholism.

I happen to know that he was successful in leaving this impression in readers who hadn't read the book, because several of them emailed me to tell me why they thought attacking a recovered alcoholic would have been a terrible idea -- something no one who has read what I wrote in context -- including Bill Clinton, who found the same passages Brooks uses as negative examples particularly compelling -- came away thinking I was advocating.

So let's take a look at what I actually said. Here is the first passage, where I would, according to Brooks, have had Gore "interrupt a presidential debate" to "bark," seemingly unprovoked, about Bush's alcoholism:. In , Gore faced what he and his advisors perceived to be a dilemma. The country had just gone through a year of scandals leading up to the impeachment trial of an otherwise very popular president The question Gore and his advisors asked and answered to their own satisfaction reflected the kind of one-dimensional thinking we have seen repeatedly in Democratic campaigns.

Is Clinton an asset or a liability to the Gore campaign? Is he a positive or a negative? The problem, though, was not the answer at which Gore and his advisors arrived but the question itself. Had they understood emotional associations, they would have asked a very different question: given that Clinton and Gore are inextricably linked in people's minds, how do we activate the positive associations people have formed to Bill Clinton over eight years and reinforce those links to Gore, and how do we inhibit the associations between Clinton's personal scandals and Gore's personal attributes?

Had they asked this question, they wouldn't have conceded all claims to the accomplishments of the Clinton-Gore years and thus enjoyed none of the positive associations while simultaneously tying their hands against all attacks for fear of invoking Clinton's name accruing every negative association George W. Bush and Karl Rove threw at them. Asked this way -- as a question about how to manage voters' ambivalence toward Bill Clinton the president and Bill Clinton the womanizer -- the answer is obvious. And the answer would have set Gore free at the start of the election or the first time Bush telegraphed that he intended to make the election a referendum on "character.

Although Bush mentioned fund-raising "scandals" such as the use of White House phone lines for campaign phone calls , those were just the conscious overlay, which had little emotional power on their own. The real message was that Clinton's sexual escapades had tarnished the dignity of the presidency, and what Bush-Rove hoped to do was to cast a wide associative net with "character" and "integrity" that would blur the lines between Clinton's personal indiscretion and Gore's integrity. Unfortunately, blinded by his anger and feelings of betrayal, and surrounded by advisers either deaf to the rising character crescendo or unable to imagine a way to bring the concerto to a close, Gore let the charge fester. To answer it, he would have had to utter Clinton's name.

He and his advisers seemed to think that if they just didn't talk about Clinton, the association would go away. But as has been the case every time Democrats have turned to avoidance as a campaign strategy, the strategy backfired, for two very important reasons. First, whether Gore liked it or not, he was inextricably linked associatively to Clinton. He was Clinton's vice president for eight years, and their names appeared in two election cycles on bumper stickers as "Clinton-Gore. Second, the other side was talking about Clinton, referring constantly to Clinton-Gore, and doing everything they could to create a network around "character" and "integrity" that made Clinton and Gore partners in crime. Gore simply ceded the networks, allowing Bush to tell whatever stories he wanted about Clinton-Gore's integrity because Gore didn't want to mention that he had been Clinton's vice president.

The irony is that although Clinton's poll numbers were low for personal integrity, his numbers were high for overall job performance -- remarkably high for a president who had spent eight years dealing with well-financed right-wing efforts to destroy him, supplemented by the Starr inquisition, financed handsomely by fifty million in American tax dollars. So imagine if Gore had responded the first time Bush first uttered any words vaguely insinuating character issues with something like this:. George Bush wants to make character an issue in this election. Governor, I wouldn't go there if I were you because it's not exactly your strong suit. No one in America, not you, not me, not Bill Clinton, is proud of what happened between him and Monica Lewinsky.

A day doesn't go by that he doesn't think about the pain he caused his family, knowing that every time Chelsea turned on the television set for a year all she heard about was her father's affair. We are all well aware of the pain he and an out-of-control Republican Congress, determined to destroy the president no matter who they had to take down with him or how much filth they had to expose our children tfo on the evening news, caused this nation. Am I proud of what Bill Clinton did with his personal life? Of course not. But I'll tell you what I am proud of. I'm proud of what Bill Clinton and I have accomplished together over the last eight years. We began with an economy in disarray, left that way by Mr.

Bush's father. We were deep into a recession that was costing Americans their jobs, with a federal government out of control, spending your grandchildren's money by the bushel, running up enormous deficits. Now look where we are today. We've created millions of jobs, we've cut unemployment to historic lows, we've put a hundred thousand new police on our streets protecting our children, we've cut the number of people on welfare by more than half, and on top of that, we balanced the budget for the first time in thirty years.

We've cut the numbers of abortions for the first time in twenty-five years, and we've given every woman in the United States the right to stay home for three months with her new baby without fear of losing her job. We've taken guns out of the hands of criminals while protecting the rights of hunters, and we've dramatically cut the crime rate. So Mr. Bush, let me give you a little word of advice. If I were you, I don't think I'd make integrity and values your campaign theme.

If someone is going to restore dignity to the Oval Office, it isn't a man who drank his way through three decades of his life and got investigated by his father's own Securities and Exchange Commission for swindling people out of their retirement savings. If you want to be president, you're going to need to convince the American people that they should abandon everything Bill Clinton and I did that has made Americans safe, secure, and prosperous again, and instead vote for a man whose biggest concern seems to be that the yacht tax is too high. Had Gore begun his campaign that way, he would have made clear that what united him and Clinton was not Clinton's handling of Monica Lewinsky but their administration's handling of the country. As importantly, he would have warned Bush and Rove that if they took off the gloves about character, so would Gore.

The way you respond to your opponent's first attacks sends a crucial signal not just to the public but to the other campaign. A weak response does nothing but embolden the opposition. And a swift response to the character issue that included a brief reference to Bush's own moral failings would have prevented Bush, and ultimately the media, from framing the campaign as a contest between a man with questionable integrity and a man with questionable experience and intellect. Americans don't care much about experience and intellect, but they do care about integrity. Unless Brooks is reading subliminal messages in my words that I can't see, I don't hear anything about interrupting a debate or barking. Nor do I hear anything about carping repeatedly on Bush's drinking.

The comment about Bush's drinking is contextualized in a much broader story that has very little to do with his history of alcoholism. It is difficult to see in Brooks' depiction of what I wrote anything other than the kind of deliberate deception we have seen repeatedly from the current administration, and precisely the kind of emotionally charged use of language e. If such language has no utility, it's odd that he chose to use it -- and to use it in precisely the deceptive ways I describe in the book as having no place in American political discourse. I will not walk readers through the other example in which Brooks has me advising Gore to "explode" at Bush about his drunkenness, but will instead refer readers to the relevant passages pp.

I leave it to readers to judge whether they hear barking and carping about drunkenness as a central theme -- central enough that Brooks returns to it later in the review:. This thesis raises some interesting questions. First, why did someone with so little faith in rational inquiry go into academia, and what does he do to those who disagree with him at Emory faculty meetings, especially recovering alcoholics?

This is a beautifully constructed ad hominem attack he comes back one more time to the Emory Psychology Department before the piece is over , because it uses humor to cover its ad hominem nature.

In your eyes you could be making the best decision Summary Of What The Words We Use Say About Us By David Brooks to someone else you may be making the worst mistake of Summary Of What The Words We Use Say About Us By David Brooks life. Why he is asking a rhetorical question when the substance, not the rhetoric, is what matters is unclear. We Nursing Accountability In Nursing privacy and individual freedom too The D-Day Invasion: The Normandy Invasion. Bush or Jacques Chiraq.

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